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Abstract. An established trend in software engineering insists on using
components (sometimes also called services or packages) to encapsulate a
set of related functionalities or data. By defining interfaces specifying what
functionalities they provide or use, components can be combined with
others to form more complex components. In this way, IT systems can
be designed by mostly re-using existing components and developing new
ones to provide new functionalities. In this paper, we introduce a notion
of component and a combination mechanism for an important class of
software artifacts, called security-sensitive workflows. These are business
processes in which execution constraints on the tasks are complemented
with authorization constraints (e.g., Separation of Duty) and authorization
policies (constraining which users can execute which tasks). We show
how well-known workflow execution patterns can be simulated by our
combination mechanism and how authorization constraints can also be
imposed across components. Then, we demonstrate the usefulness of our
notion of component by showing (i) the scalability of a technique for the
synthesis of run-time monitors for security-sensitive workflows and (ii)
the design of a plug-in for the re-use of workflows and related run-time
monitors inside an editor for security-sensitive workflows.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, business processes constantly strive to adapt to rapidly evolving
markets under continuous pressure of regulatory and technological changes.
In this respect, the most frequent problem faced by companies is the lack of
automation when trying to incorporate new business requirements into existing
processes. A traditional approach to business process modeling frequently results
in large models that are difficult to change and maintain. This makes it critical
that business process models be modular and flexible, not only for increased
modeling agility at design-time but also for greater robustness and flexibility
of enacting processes at run-time (see, e.g., [11] for a discussion about this and
related problems).
The situation is further complicated when considering the class of security-
sensitive workflows [1], i.e. when tasks in processes are executed under the
responsibility of humans or software agents acting on their behalf. This means
that, besides the usual execution constraints (specified by causal relations among
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tasks), security-sensitive workflows add authorization policies and constraints, i.e.
under which conditions users can execute tasks. Authorization policies are usually
specified by using some variant of the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model,
see, e.g., [20], while authorization constraints restrict which users can execute
some set of tasks in a given workflow instance; an example is the Separation of
Duties (SoD) constraint requiring two tasks to be executed by distinct users. Since
authorization policies and constraints may prevent the successful termination of
the workflow (i.e. not all tasks can be executed), it is crucial to be able to solve
at design-time, the Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP) [5], i.e. establishing
if all tasks in the workflow can be executed satisfying the authorization policy
without violating any authorization constraint, and at run-time, a variant of the
WSP requiring the synthesis of a monitor capable of granting the request of a
user to execute a task if this does not prevent the successful termination of the
workflow instance (see, e.g., [2,3]). The combination of the need for modularity
and flexibility with that for developing efficient techniques to solve the WSP and
its run-time variant gives rise to new fundamental questions, such as
Q1: how can we specify security-sensitive workflow components, i.e. business
processes equipped with interfaces defining their inputs and outputs together
with their dependencies (a component declares the services it provides and
those that it depends upon)?
Q2: how can we “glue together” components into a more complex one that can
again be combined with others if necessary?
Q3: how can we solve the WSP and synthesize run-time monitors for security-
sensitive workflow components that can be modularly re-used to solve the
WSP and synthesize a run-time monitor for their combination?
In this paper, we provide answers to the three questions above by making the
following contributions:
A1: we introduce the notion of security-sensitive workflow component (Section 2)
as a symbolic transition system extended with a suitable notion of interface,
A2: we define how components can be “glued together” (Section 3) by specifying
how execution and authorization constraints of components become related,
A3: we describe how run-time monitors solving the WSP of security-sensitive
workflow components can be modularly reused (Section 4) to build one solving
the WSP of their combination.
We show the adequacy of A1 and A2 by showing how a typical security-sensitive
workflow can be specified as a composition of components (Section 2). (A2 is
further elaborated in Appendix A by demonstrating how the main composition
patterns for workflows, such as those in [19], can be simulated by our notion of
gluing.)
Another contribution of the paper is an investigation of how our proposal
can be exploited in an industrial setting (Section 4). In particular, we consider
two main issues. First, we show how splitting into several modules large security-
sensitive workflows, by using A1 and A2, allows for the synthesis of run-time
Fig. 1. TRW (left) and MDW (right) in extended BPM notation
monitors to scale up, by using A3. Second, we sketch the architecture of a
tool for the creation of security-sensitive workflows which maintains a library of
components together with their run-time monitors. This holds the promise to
help workflow designers in their quest for adapting processes to rapidly evolving
requirements.
2 Security-sensitive Workflow Components
We introduce a refinement of the notion of symbolic transition system in [3] which,
associated to a suitable notion of interface, constitutes a (symbolic) security-
sensitive component. We motivate the utility of this notion by means of an
example.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows two workflows in BPM Notation (BPMN) [13]. Each
workflow contains two circles, the one on the left represents the start event
(triggering the execution of the workflow), whereas that on the right the end
event (terminating the execution of the workflow), tasks are depicted by labeled
boxes, the constraints on the execution of tasks are shown as solid arrows (for
sequence flows) and diamonds labeled by + (for parallel flows), the fact that a
task must be executed under the responsibility of a user is indicated by the man
icon inside a box, and the SoD constraints as dashed lines labeled by 6=.
The workflow on the left is the Trip Request Workflow (TRW) whose goal is
that of requesting trips for employees in an organization. It is composed of five
tasks: Request (t1), Car rental (t2), Hotel booking (t3), Flight reservation (t4),
and Validation (t5). Five Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints must be enforced,
i.e. the tasks in the pairs (t1, t2), (t1, t4), (t2, t3), (t2, t5), and (t3, t5) must be
executed by distinct users in any sequence of task executions of the TRW.
The workflow on the right is the Moderate Discussion Workflow (MDW)
whose goal is to organize a discussion and voting process in an organization. It is
composed of four tasks: Request (t1), Moderate Conference Call (t7), Moderate e-
mail Discussion (t7), and Validation (t5). Four SoD constraints must be enforced:
(t1, t6), (t6, t5), (t6, t7), and (t7, t5).
In both workflows, each task is executed under the responsibility of a user
who has the right to execute it according to some authorization policy, which—for
the sake of brevity—we leave unspecified.
Notice that tasks t1 and t5 in Figure 1 are the same in both TRW and MDW.
The goal of this paper is to develop a notion of security-sensitive component
such that tasks t1 and t5 can be modularly reused in the specifications of both
workflows so that only the specification of the parallel execution of tasks t2, t3,
and t4 for the TRW and t6 and t7 for the MDW must be developed from scratch
in the two cases. Additionally, we want that run-time monitors for the various
components can also be modularly reused.
Indeed, the simplicity of the TRW and MDW spoils the advantages of a
modular approach; the small dimension of the workflows allows us to keep the
paper to a reasonable size. However, for large workflows—as we will see below in
Section 4—the advantages are substantial. To give an intuition of this, imagine to
replace the tasks reused in both workflows, i.e. t1 and t5, with complex workflows:
reusing their specifications and being able to synthesize run-time monitors for
them, that can be used for larger workflows in which they are plugged, becomes
much more interesting. uunionsq
A (symbolic) security-sensitive component is a pair (S, Int) where S is a (symbolic)
security-sensitive transition system and Int is its interface.
Security-sensitive transition system. Since the semantics of BPMN can be
given by means of (extensions of) Petri nets (see, e.g., [19]) and the latter can be
represented as symbolic state transition systems (see, e.g., [16]), S is the symbolic
transition system that can be associated to security sensitive workflows specified
in BPMN as those in Figure 1. A (symbolic) security-sensitive transition system
S is a tuple of the form ((P,D,A,H,C),Tr , B) where P ∪D∪A∪H ∪C are the
state variables, Tr is a set of transitions, and B is a set of constraints on the state
variables in C. The finite set P contains Boolean variables representing the places
of the Petri net associated to a BPMN specification of the security-sensitive
workflow and D is a finite set of Boolean variables representing the fact that a
task has been executed or not; P ∪D are called execution constraint variables.
The finite set A contains interface predicates to the authorization policy, H is a
set of predicates recording which users have executed which tasks, and C is a
set of interface predicates to the authorization constraints; A ∪H ∪ C are called
authorization constraint variables. The set Tr contains the transitions (or events)
of the form
t(u) : enEC(P,D) ∧ enAuth(A,C)→ actEC(P,D)||actAuth(H) (1)
where t is the name of a task taken from a finite set, u is a variable ranging over a
set U of users, enEC(P,D) is a predicate on P∪D (called the enabling condition for
the execution constraint), enAuth(A,C) is a predicate on {v(u)|v ∈ A∪C} (called
the enabling condition for the authorization constraint), actEC(P,D) contains
parallel assignments of the form v := b where v ∈ P ∪D and b is a Boolean value
(called the update of the execution constraint of the security sensitive workflow),
and actAuth(H) contains parallel assignments of the form v(u) := b where v ∈ H
and b is a Boolean value (called the update of the authorization history of the
security sensitive workflow).1 Finally, the finite set B contains always constraints
1 The assignment v(u) := b leaves unchanged the value returned by v for any u′ distinct
from u. In other words, after the assignment, the value of v can be expressed as
follows: λx.if x = u then b else v(x).
of the form
∀u.v(u)⇔ hst , (2)
where u is a variable ranging over users, v is a variable in C, and hst is a Boolean
combination of atoms of the form w(u) with w ∈ H.
Interface of a security-sensitive component. The interface Int of a symbolic
security-sensitive component (S, Int) is a tuple of the form (A,P i, P o, Ho, Ci)
where
– P i ⊆ P and each pi ∈ P i is such that pi := T does not occur in the parallel
assignments of an event of the form (1) in Tr ,
– P o ⊆ P and each po ∈ P o is such that po := T occurs in the parallel
assignments of an event of the form (1) in Tr whereas po := F does not,
– Ho ⊆ H, Ci ⊆ C, and
– only the variables in (C \Ci)∪Ho can occur in a symbolic always constraint
of B.
When P i, P o, Ho, and Ci are all empty, the component (S, Int) can only be
interfaced with an authorization policy via the interface variables in A. The
state variables in D are only used internally, to indicate that a task has been
or has not been executed; thus, none of them is exposed in the interface Int .
The variables in P , H, and C are local to S but some of them can be exposed
in the interface in order to enable the combination of S with other components
in a way which will be described below (Section 3). The super-scripts i and o
stand for input and output, respectively. The requirement that variables in P i
are not assigned the value T (rue) by any transition of the component allows their
values to be determined by those in another component. Dually, the requirement
that variables in P o can only be assigned the value T (rue) by any transition
of the component allows them to determine the values of variables in another
component. Similarly to the values of the variables in P i, those of the variables
in Ci are fixed when combining the module with another; this is the reason for
which only the variables in C \ Ci can occur in the always constraints of the
component.
Example 2. We now illustrate the notion of security-sensitive component by
considering the workflows in Figure 1. As said in Example 1, we want to reuse
tasks t1 and t5 in both TRW and MDW. For this, we split the specification of each
workflow in four components C1, C234, C67, and C5 as shown in Figure 2, where
the sequential composition of C1, C234, and C5 yields TRW and that of C1, C67,
and C5 gives MDW. The figure shows the extended Petri nets representing the
four components and how they are connected: circles represent places, rectangles
with a man icon transitions to be executed under the responsibility of users,
rectangles without the icon transitions not needing human intervention, (black)
dashed lines represent SoD constraints between tasks belonging to the same
component, (gray) dashed lines SoD constraints between tasks belonging to
distinct components, (black) solid arrows the control flow in the same component,
Fig. 2. TRW and MDW as combinations of security-sensitive components
and (gray) dashed arrows the control flow between two components. Note that
the control flow between two components is outside of the semantics of extended
Petri nets. For example, a token in place p0 of C1 goes to p1 of C1 after the
execution of t1 and, at the same time a token is put in place p1 of C234 because
of the (gray) dashed arrow from p1 in C1 to p0 in C234 representing an inter
execution constraint. When the token is in p0, the system executes the split
transition s in C234 that removes the token from p0 and puts one in p1, p2, and
p3 so that t2, t3, and t4 in C234 become enabled. Notice that the execution of t2
is constrained by a SoD constraint from task t1 in component C1 (dashed arrow
between t1 in C1 and t2 in C234): this means that the user who has executed t1
in C1 cannot execute also t2 in C234.
We now show how to formalize the components depicted in Figure 2 by defining
C1 = (S1, Int1), C5 = (S5, Int5), C234 = (S234, Int234), and C67 = (S67, Int67)
where Sy = ((Py, Dy, Ay, Hy, Cy),Try, By), and Inty = (Ay, P
i
y, P
o
y , H
o
y , C
i
y) for
y = 1, 5, 234, 67. For components C1 and C5, we set
Py := {p0y, p1y} Dy := {dty} Ay := {aty} Hy := {hty} Cy := {city} By := ∅
P iy := {p0y} P oy := {p1y} Hoy := {hty} .
for y = 1, 5, and take
Tr1 := {t1(u) : p01 ∧ ¬dt1 ∧ at1(u)→ p01, p11, dt1, ht1(u) := F, T, T, T}
Tr5 := {t5(u) : p05 ∧ ¬dt5 ∧ at5(u) ∧ cit5(u)→ p05, p15, dt5, ht5(u) := F, T, T, T}
Ci1 := ∅ Ci5 := {cit5} .
According to the transition in Tr1, task t1 is enabled when there is a token
in place p01 (place p0 of component C1 in Figure 2), t1 has not been already
executed (¬dt1) and there exists a user u capable of executing t1 (at1(u)). The
effect of executing such a transition is to move the token from p01 to p11 (places
p0 and p1 of component C1 in Figure 2, respectively), set dt1 to true meaning
that t1 has been executed, and recording that t1 has been executed by u. The
interface of each component is the following: p0y is the input place, p1y is the
output place, and the history variable hty can be used to constrain the execution
of tasks in other components (for instance of t2 in the TRW as t1 and t2 are
involved in a SoD, shown by the gray dashed line between the two tasks in
Figure 2). Notice that the execution of task t1 cannot be constrained by the
execution of tasks in other components (thus Ci1 := ∅) since t1 is always executed
before all other tasks and cannot possibly be influenced by their execution. The
definition of the transition in Tr5 is similar to that in Tr1 except for the fact
that the execution of task t5 can be constrained by the execution of tasks in
other components (thus Ci5 := {cit5}) since t5 is always executed after all other
tasks and can be influenced by their execution. In particular, cit5 will be defined
so as to satisfy the SoD constraints between t5 and t2 or t3 for TRW and t6 or
t7 for MDW. For component C234, we set
P234 := {py234|y = 0, ..., 7} D234 := {s234, j234, dty|y = 2, 3, 4}
A234 := {aty|y = 2, 3, 4} H234 := {hty|y = 2, 3, 4} C234 := {ct2, ct3, city|y = 2, 3, 4}
B234 := {∀u.ct2(u)⇔ ¬ht3(u),∀u.ct3(u)⇔ ¬ht2(u)}
Tr234 :=

s234 : p0234 ∧ ¬ds → p0234, p1234, p2234, p3234, ds234 := F, T, T, T, T
t2(u) : p1234 ∧ ¬dt2 ∧ at2(u) ∧ ct2(u) ∧ cit2(u)
→ p1234, p4234, dt2, ht2(u) := F, T, T, T
t3(u) : p2234 ∧ ¬dt3 ∧ at3(u) ∧ ct3(u) ∧ cit3(u)
→ p2234, p5234, dt3, ht3(u) := F, T, T, T
t4(u) : p3234 ∧ ¬dt4 ∧ at4(u) ∧ cit4(u)
→ p3234, p6234, dt4, ht4(u) := F, T, T, T
j234 : p4234 ∧ p5234 ∧ p6234 ∧ ¬dj
→ p4234, p5234, p6234, p7234, dj234 := F, F, F, T, T

P i234 := {p0234} P o234 := {p7234} Ho234 := {ht2, ht3} Ci234 := {cit2, cit4}.
Transitions s234 and j234 (corresponding to the rectangles labeled s and j of
component C234 in Figure 2) model the parallel composition of tasks t2, t3, and
t4 in TRW and MDW (cf. the parallel flows depicted as diamonds labeled with
+ in Figure 1). Since no human intervention is needed, the enabling conditions
for the authorization constraint of both transitions are omitted. Tasks t2 and
t3 are involved in a SoD constraint (cf. the dashed lines labeled by 6= between
t2 and t3 in Figure 2). For this reason, their enabling conditions contain ct2(u)
and ct3(u) which are defined in B234 so as to prevent the execution of t2 and t3
by the same users: to execute t3 (t2, resp.), user u must be such that ¬ht2(u)
(¬ht3(u), resp.), i.e. u should have not executed t2 (t3, resp.). Transitions t2, t3,
and t4 in Tr234 have enabling conditions that contain c
i
t2(u), c
i
t3(u), and c
i
t4(u)
which will be defined so as to satisfy the SoD constraints in which the tasks
are involved (cf. the gray dashed lines across the rectangles in Figure 2). The
definition of component C67 is quite similar (albeit simpler) to that of C234:
P67 := {py67|y = 0, ..., 5} D67 := {s67, j67, dty|y = 6, 7} A67 := {aty|y = 6, 7}
H67 := {hty|y = 6, 7} C67 := {cty, city|y = 6, 7}
B67 := {∀u.ct6(u)⇔ ¬ht7(u),∀u.ct7(u)⇔ ¬ht6(u)}
Tr67 :=

s67 : p067 ∧ ¬ds → p067, p167, p267, ds67 := F, T, T, T
t6(u) : p167 ∧ ¬dt6 ∧ at6(u) ∧ ct6(u) ∧ cit6(u)
→ p167, p367, dt6, ht6(u) := F, T, T, T
t7(u) : p267 ∧ ¬dt7 ∧ at7(u) ∧ ct7(u) ∧ cit7(u)
→ p267, p467, dt7, ht7(u) := F, T, T, T
j67 : p367 ∧ p467 ∧ ¬dj → p367, p467, p567, dj67 := F, F, T, T

P i67 := {p067} P o67 := {p567} Ho67 := {ht6, ht7} Ci67 := {cit6}.
Section 3 below explains how components C1, C234, C67, and C5 can be “glued
together” to build TRW and MDW. uunionsq
Semantics of a security-sensitive component. The notion of symbolic
security-sensitive transition system introduced here is equivalent to that in [3];
the only difference being the presence of the authorization constraint variables
in C together with the always constraints in B. It is easy to see that, given
a transition system ((P,D,A,H,C),Tr , B), it is always possible to eliminate
the variables in C occurring in B from the conditions of transitions in Tr by
using (2): it is sufficient to replace each occurrence of v(u) with hst . Let [[tr ]]B
denote the transition obtained from tr by exhaustively replacing the variables
in C that also occur in B as explained above. Since no variable in C may occur
in the update of a transition and in the enabling condition for the execution
constraint of a transition, by abuse of notation, we apply the operator [[·]]B to
the enabling condition for the authorization constraint of tr . The substitution
process eventually terminates since in hst there is no occurrence of variables in
the finite set C, only the variables in H may occur. The possibility of eliminating
the variables in C allows us to give the semantics of the class of (symbolic)
security-sensitive transition systems considered here by using the notion of weak-
est liberal precondition (wlp) [7] as done in [3]. The intuition is that computing
a wlp with respect to the transitions in Tr and the always constraints in B is
equivalent to computing that with respect to [[Tr ]]B . Formally, we define
wlp(Tr , B,K) :=
∨
tr∈Tr
(enEC ∧ [[enAuth]]B ∧K[actEC||actAuth]) (3)
where B is a set of always constraints, tr is of the form (1), K is a predicate over
P ∪D ∪ A ∪ C, and K[actEC||actAuth] denotes the predicate obtained from K
by substituting
– each variable v ∈ P ∪D with the value b when the assignment v := b is in
actEC and
– each variable v ∈ H with λx.if x = u then b else v(x) when v(x) := b is in
actAuth for b a Boolean value.
It is easy to show that wlp(Tr , B,K) is
∨
tr∈Tr wlp(tr , B,K). When Tr is a
singleton containing one symbolic transition tr , we write wlp(tr , B,K) instead of
wlp({tr}, B,K).
A symbolic behavior of a security-sensitive transition system S = ((P,D,A,H,
C),Tr , B) is a sequence of the form K0
tr0−→ K1 tr1−→ · · · trn−1−→ Kn where Ki is a
predicate over P ∪D ∪ A ∪ C and tr i is a symbolic transition such that Ki is
logically equivalent to wlp(tr i, B,Ki+1) for i = 0, ..., n− 1. The semantics of the
security-sensitive transition system S is the set of all possible symbolic behaviors.
The semantics of a security-sensitive component (S, Int) is the set of all possible
symbolic behaviors of the security-sensitive transition system S.
Example 3. We consider component C5 (cf. Example 2) and compute the wlp
with respect to t5(u) (in the set Tr5 of transitions) for the following predicate
¬p05 ∧ p15 ∧ dt5 characterizing the set of final states of C5, i.e. those states in
which task t5 has been executed and there is just one token in place p15. By
using definition (3) above, we obtain p05 ∧¬dt5 ∧ at5(u)∧ cit5(u), which identifies
those states in which there is a token in place p01, task t1 has not yet been
executed, and user u has the right to execute t1 and authorization constraints
imposed by other components are satisfied (e.g., the SoD constraint between t5
and t2 in C234 for the TRW). uunionsq
3 Gluing together Security-Sensitive Components
We now show how components can be combined together in order to build other,
more complex, components. For l = 1, 2, let (Sl, Int l) be a symbolic security-
sensitive component where Int l = (A,P
i
l , P
o
l , H
o
l , C
i
l ) and Sl = ((Pl, Dl, Al, Hl,
Cl),Tr l, Bl) is such that P1 and P2, D1 and D2, A1 and A2, H1 and H2, C1
and C2 are pairwise disjoint sets. Furthermore, let G = GEC ∪GAuth be a set of
gluing assertions over Int1 and Int2, where
– GEC is a set of formulae of the form p
i ⇔ po for pi ∈ P ik and po ∈ P oj , called
inter execution constraints, and
– GAuth is a set of always constraints in which only the variables in C
i
k ∪Hoj
may occur,
for k, j = 1, 2 and k 6= j. Intuitively, the gluing assertions in G specify inter
component constraints; those in GEC how the control flow is passed from one
component to another whereas those in GAuth authorization constraints across
components, i.e. how the fact that a task in a component is executed by a certain
user constrains the execution of a task in another component by a sub-set of the
users entitled to do so.
The symbolic security-sensitive component (S, Int) obtained by gluing (S1, Int1)
and (S2, Int2) together with G, in symbols (S, Int) = (S1, Int1)⊕G (S2, Int2), is
defined as S = ((P,D,A,H,C),Tr , B) and Int = (A,P i, P o, Ho, Ci), where
– P = P1 ∪ P2, D = D1 ∪D2, A = A1 ∪A2, H = H1 ∪H2, C = C1 ∪ C2,
– Tr := [Tr1]GEC ∪ [Tr2]GEC where [Tr j ]GEC := {[tr j ]GEC |tr j ∈ Tr j} and
[tr j ]GEC is obtained from tr j by adding the assignment p
i := b if pi is in P ij ,
there exists an inter execution constraint of the form pi ⇔ po in GEC, po is
in P ok , and p
o := b is among the parallel assignments of tr j ; otherwise, tr j is
returned unchanged, for j, k = 1, 2 and j 6= k,
– B = B1 ∪B2 ∪GAuth,
– P i = {p ∈ (P i1 ∪ P i2)|p does not occur in GEC},
– P o = {p ∈ (P o1 ∪ P o2 )|p does not occur in GEC},
– Ho = Ho1 ∪Ho2 , and
– Ci = {c ∈ (Ci1 ∪ Ci2)|c does not occur in GAuth}.
The definition is well formed since S is obviously a security-sensitive transition
system and Int satisfies all the structural constraints at page 5.
Example 4. Let us consider components C1 and C234 of Example 2. We glue
them together by using the following set G = GEC ∪GAuth of gluing assertions
where GEC := {p11 ⇔ p0234} and GAuth := {∀u.cit2(u) ⇔ ¬ht1(u),∀u.cit4(u) ⇔
¬ht1(u)}. The inter execution constraint in GEC corresponds to the dashed arrow
connecting p1 in component C1 (p11) to p0 in component C234 (p0234) in Figure 2.
The always constraints in GAuth formalize the dashed lines linking task t1 of
component C1 to tasks t2 and t4 of component C234. The component obtained by
gluing C1 and C234 together with G (in symbols, C1 ⊕G C234) is such that
– its set of transitions contains all transitions in Tr234 plus the transition in
Tr1 modified to take into account the inter execution constraint in GEC, i.e.
t1(u) : p01 ∧ ¬dt1 ∧ at1(u)→ p01, p11, dt1, ht1(u) := F, T, T, T ||p0234 := T
ensuring that when the token is put in p11 it is also put in p0234 (in this way,
we can specify how the control flow is transferred from C1 to C234);
– its set of always constraints contains all the constraints in B1 and B234 plus
those in GAuth so that the SoD constraints between task t1 in C1 and tasks
t2 and t4 in C234 are added;
– if its interface is (A,P i, P o, Ho, Ci), then P i := {p11} since p0234 occurs in
GEC, P
0 := {p7234} since p11 occurs in GEC, and Ci := ∅ since both cit2 and
cit4 occur in GAuth.
Notice that C1 ⊕G C234 can be combined with C5 so as to form a component
corresponding to the TRW in Figure 1. This is possible by considering the
following set G′ = G′EC∪G′Auth of gluing assertions where G′EC := {p7234 ⇔ p05}
and G′Auth := {∀u.cit5(u)⇔ ¬ht2(u)∧¬ht3(u)}. The inter execution constraint in
G′EC corresponds to the dashed arrow connecting p7 in component C234 (p7234) to
p0 in component C5 (p05) in Figure 2. The always constraint in GAuth formalizes
the dashed lines linking task t5 of C5 with tasks t2 and t3 of C234. uunionsq
We now illustrate the computation of the wlp with respect to the transitions
of a composed component by means of an example.
Example 5. Let us consider (C1⊕G C234)⊕G′ C5 of Example 4 and the predicates
K1 := ¬p01 ∧ dt1 K5 := ¬p05 ∧ p15 ∧ dt5
K234 :=
∧
i=0,...,6
¬pi234 ∧ dt2 ∧ dt3 ∧ dt4 ∧ ds234 ∧ dj234
whose conjunction K characterizes the final states of TRW, i.e. those situations in
which all tasks have been executed and there is just one token in place p15 (notice
that K234 does not mention p7234 whose value is implied by K5 and the inter
execution constraints p7234 ⇔ p05 and similarly K1 does not mention p11 whose
value is implied by K234 and the inter execution constraint in p11 ⇔ p0234).
Now we compute wlp(t5, B,K) where B is the union of B1, B234, B5, GAuth,
and G′Auth given in Example 4 by using (3):
K1 ∧K234 ∧ (p05 ∧ ¬dt5 ∧ at5(u) ∧ ¬ht2(u) ∧ ¬ht3(u)) . (4)
Notice how K1 and K234 have not been modified since the parallel updates of t5
do not mention any of the state variables in C1 and C234 but only those of C5,
namely p05 and dt5.
To illustrate how the computation of wlp takes into account the transfer of
the control flow from one component to another, let us compute the wlp of (4)
with respect to transition j in component C234. According to the definition of
composition of components, transition j234 becomes
j∗234 : p4234 ∧ p5234 ∧ p6234 ∧ ¬dj234
→ p4234, p5234, p6234, p7234, dj234 := F, F, F, T, T ||p05 := T .
Notice the added assignment p05 := T to take into account the inter execution
constraint in G′EC (see Example 4) ensuring that when the token is put in p7234,
it is also put in p05. By using (3), we have that wlp(j
∗
234, B, (4)) is
K1 ∧
¬p0234 ∧ ¬p1234 ∧ ¬p2234∧¬p3234 ∧ p4234 ∧ p5234 ∧ p6234∧
¬dt2 ∧ ¬dt3 ∧ ¬dt4 ∧ ¬ds234 ∧ dj234
 ∧ (¬dt5 ∧ at5(u)∧¬ht2(u) ∧ ¬ht3(u)
)
. (5)
Notice how K1 is left unmodified since it describes the state of component C1
and no gluing assertions involve state variables of C1 and those in the update of
j∗234, K234 instead is modified substantially (see the predicate in square brackets)
since j234 is a transition of component C234, while the remaining part of (5) is
almost identical to the formula between parentheses in (4) except for the deletion
of p05 because of the additional assignment p05 := T in j
∗
234, introduced to take
into account the inter execution constraint in G′Auth.
An alternative way of computing wlp(j∗234, B, (4)) is the following. Observe
that the value of p7234 is fixed to T because of the inter execution constraint p05 ⇔
p7234 in GAuth and the fact that (4) implies that p05 is T . Thus, we can consider
the predicate K234∧p7234 and then compute wlp(j234, B234,K234∧p7234) which is
the predicate in square brackets of (5). By taking the conjunction of this formula
with K1 and the predicate obtained by deleting p05 from wlp(t5, B5 ∪GAuth,K5)
in which we delete p05 (because (4) implies that p05 is T ) thereby obtaining the
predicate between parentheses in (4), we derive (5) as before. uunionsq
The last paragraph of the example suggests a modular approach to computing
wlp’s. It is indeed possible to generalize the process described above and derive
a modularity result for computing the wlp of a complex component by using
the wlp’s of its components by taking into account the gluing assertions. We do
not do this here because it is not central to the applications of the notion of
component discussed in Section 4 below.
Theorem 1. Let (Sk, Intk) be a symbolic security-sensitive component for k =
1, 2, 3, G1,2 be a set of gluing assertions over Int1 and Int2, and G2,3 be a set of
gluing assertions over Int2 and Int3. Then,
Commutativity: (S1, Int1)⊕G1,2 (S2, Int2) = (S2, Int2)⊕G1,2 (S1, Int1) and
Associativity: ((S1, Int1)⊕G(S2, Int2))⊕G(S3, Int3) = (S1, Int1)⊕G((S2, Int2)⊕G
(S3, Int3)) for G = G1,2 ∪G2,3.
The proof is straightforward and based on the commutativity and associativity
of set union. Notice that the associativity property above is expressed by taking
into account the union of the gluing assertions over the interfaces of the reusable
systems being combined.
Example 6. Recall the components of Example 4. Because of Theorem 1, we have
that the TRW can be expressed as C1 ⊕G′′ C234 ⊕G′′ C5 for G′′ = G ∪G′ where
G,G′ have been defined in Example 4.
Notice that, despite the commutativity of the operator ⊕, the task in C1 will
always be executed before all tasks in components C234 and C5 because of the
gluing assertions in G′′. Thus, the component C234 ⊕G′′ C1 ⊕G′′ C5 obtained by
considering the components in a different order is equivalent to TRW. uunionsq
Appendix A shows how standard composition patterns available in the literature
for workflows can be expressed by using the notion of components and the
composition operator ⊕ introduced above.
4 Applications
We present two applications of security-sensitive components and their modular
combination which are made possible by the same modularity result about the
synthesis of run-time monitors for the WSP.
In [3], we have shown how to automatically derive a monitor capable of
solving the run-time version of the Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP) [5]
of a security-sensitive transition system. As already discussed in the paragraph
“Semantics of a security-sensitive component” in Section 2, the notion of
security-sensitive transition system introduced here and that in [3] are equivalent.
In particular, given a security-sensitive transition system ((P,D,A,H,C),Tr , B)
we can derive an equivalent security-sensitive transition system of the form
((P,D,A′, H, ∅), {[[tr ]]B |tr ∈ B}, ∅), which is precisely a security-sensitive transi-
tion system of [3], where A′ contains the variables in A and those in C which
are not mentioned in B. Let RM be the procedure which takes as input a
security-sensitive transition system S = ((P,D,A,H,C),Tr , B), applies the
transformation above, and then the procedure for the synthesis of run-time
monitors described in [3], which returns a Datalog [4] program RM(S) defining
a predicate can do(u, t) such that user u can execute task t and the workflow
can successfully terminate iff can do(u, t) is a logical consequence (in the sense of
Datalog) of RM(S) ∪ P ∪H (in symbols RM(S),P,H |= can do(u, t)), where
P is a Datalog program defining the meaning of the predicates in A (i.e. the
authorization policy) and H is a set of history facts of the form ht(u), recording
the fact that user u has executed task t.2
We now show how to reuse RM for the modular construction of run-time
monitors for the WSP, i.e. we build a monitor for a composite component by
combining those for their constituent components. Let G = GEC ∪GAuth be a
set of gluing assertions where GEC is a set of inter execution constraints and
GAuth a set of always constraints over an interface (A,P
i, P o, Ho, Ci), then
〈G〉 := 〈GEC〉 ∪ 〈GAuth〉, where 〈GEC〉 := {pi ← po|pi ⇔ po ∈ GEC} and
〈GAuth〉 := {ci(u)← hst i(u)|∀u.ci(u)⇔ hst i(u) ∈ GAuth}. Intuitively, the shape
of the Datalog clauses in 〈GEC〉 models how the execution flow is transferred
from a component (that with an output place) to the other (that with an input
place).
Theorem 2. Let (Sk, Intk) be a symbolic security-sensitive component, Sk =
((Pk, Dk, Ak, Hk, Ck),Trk, Bk), Hk is a set of (history) facts over Hk, and Pk
a Datalog program (for the authorization policy) over Ak, for k = 1, 2. If G is
a set of gluing assertions over Int1 and Int2, then RM(S),H1,H2,P1,P2 |=
can do(u, t) iff RM(S1),H1,P1, 〈G〉,RM(S2),H2,P2 |= can do(u, t) , where
(S, Int) = (S1, Int1)⊕G (S2, Int2).
The idea underlying the proof of this theorem is that the monitors for the
components are computed by considering any possible values for the variables
in their interfaces. The additional constraints in the gluing assertions simply
consider a sub-set of all these values by specifying how the execution flow goes
from one component to the other and how the authorization constraints across
components further constrain the possible executions of a component depending
on which users have executed certain tasks in the other.
As anticipated above, Theorem 2 paves the way to two applications which
are discussed more in detail in the following.
Scalability of the Synthesis of Run-Time Monitors. It is possible to de-
compose large workflows into smaller components by using pre-existing techniques
(see, e.g., [14]), generate monitors for each module and glue them, allowing us to
solve the WSP for very large workflows, which would be otherwise intractable
2 There is an established line of research (see, e.g., [10]) that has used (variants of)
Datalog to express authorization policies.
Fig. 3. Time taken to synthesize a monitor varying with the number of tasks
due to state space explosion as shown in [3]. The main obstacle to the monitor
synthesis is the state space explosion caused by the need of computing all the
possible interleavings of task executions and the execution of these tasks by the
users. Theorem 2 allows for splitting a large security-sensitive workflow into
smaller components, allowing one to synthesize the monitors for such components
with smaller state spaces and then glue them together in order to build the
monitor for the composed component.
To show the practical scalability of this approach, we have performed a set
of experiments with the random workflow generator from [3], which is capable
of generating random security-sensitive workflows with an arbitrary number of
tasks and composing them sequentially. For the experiments, we have generated
components with a fixed size of 5 tasks and a varying number of constraints. The
number of constraints is specified as a percentage (5%, 10% and 20%) of the
number of tasks in each component for intra-component constraints and as a
percentage of the total number of tasks for inter-component constraints. Thus, in
the configurations 5% and 10% there are no intra-component constraints, while
in the configuration 20% there is one for each component; for a workflow with
100 tasks, there are 5 inter-component constraints in the configuration 5%, 10 in
the configuration 10% and 20 in the configuration 20%. The experiments have
been conducted on a MacBook Air 2014 with a 1.3GHz dual-core Intel Core i5
processor and 8GB of RAM running MAC OS X 10.10.2. The results are shown
in Figure 3, in which the x-axis contains the total number of tasks in a workflow
divided by 10 (the total number of components is the number in the x axis times
2) and the y-axis shows the total time in seconds taken by the monitor synthesis
procedure RM of [3]. Each data point is taken as the average of running RM 5
times for each configuration. Figure 3 suggests a linear (instead of the expected
exponential!) behavior with respect to the number of tasks on this set of synthetic
benchmarks.
A Tool for the Design and Reuse of Components and Monitors. Recent
practices in business process management have emphasized the use of business
Fig. 4. Architecture of a business process design tool integrated with a repository
of models and monitors
process repositories [22] in order to promote process reuse and more quickly ad-
dress the rapidly evolving requirements on business process. Theorem 2 supports
not only the creation of repositories containing reusable business processes in
the form of security-sensitive workflows but also associating with them run-time
monitors that can be modularly combined to create more complex monitors for
composed components. These are important features in the context of industrial
applications of business processes, as they support reuse of existing technologies
(editors and repositories of business processes) and augment them by monitor
synthesis capabilities that make the synthesis automatic, scalable (as shown by
the experiments above), and transparent to the final user (the procedure RM is
fully automated). Figure 4 outlines the high-level architecture of a tool exploiting
the ideas discussed here. Rectangles represent components, ovals represent stor-
age systems, R-labeled links represent request/response communication channels
between components (where the direction of the arrow states the direction of the
request), and arrows represent access to storages. The BPM (Business Process
Management) component represents any existing solution including a modeling
environment for BPMN-based business processes. The Process Composer sub-
component is the modeling environment offering a BPMN editor. Examples of
BPM systems are IBM Business Process Manager3, SAP Netweaver BPM4, and
Signavio Process Editor5. The Monitor Synthesizer component implements the
procedure RM described above to compute (modular) monitors for workflow
components and their composition modeled in the process composer. The Repos-
itory component represents a storage system for workflow models together with
the monitor synthesized by the (modular) monitor synthesizer. Note that such
repository may be part of the BPM solution (as in, e.g., IBM Business Process
Manager) or remotely located (e.g., Apromore [15]). The modeler interacts with
the process composer with a request/response relation. The same relation ex-
ists between the process composer and the monitor synthesizer to request the
synthesis of a run-time monitor for the BPMN model under specification. The
process composer can store/retrieve BPMN models together with the synthesized
monitors to/from the repository.
Example 7. Let us recall the situation in Example 2. The tool in Figure 4
allows us to re-use components C1 and C5 in both the specification of TRW and
3 http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/business-process-manager-family
4 http://scn.sap.com/docs/DOC-27944
5 http://www.signavio.com/products/process-editor/
MDW as shown in Figure 2. Additionally, the capability of storing automatically
synthesized run-time monitors in the repository associated to the components
permits their re-use in different business processes thanks to the modularity
result in Theorem 2. uunionsq
The business process modeling (process composer in Figure 4) and repository
components in the proposed architecture are also part of common reference archi-
tectures, e.g., [21]. The monitor synthesizer and the extension of the repository
to store monitors are unique contributions of this paper. Whenever a business
modeler uses the process composer, he/she can import models with their associ-
ated monitors from the repository, combine the models with new or pre-existing
models and export the resulting complex component back to the repository,
storing the process together with its monitor. Notice that the monitor synthesis
of the various components can be done, when necessary, while the editing is
progressing, thereby optimizing the waiting time for the monitor.
So far, we have implemented the (modular) monitor synthesizer as a command-
line tool and not yet integrated it with a modeling environment. We intend to
do so using the extensible Signavio Core Components6 editor and a repository
structure like Apromore [15], which is already integrated with the editor and
supports BPMN 2.0 models for processes. The repository must be extended
to store parametric Datalog monitors associated with BPMN. We believe that,
since all the steps are automated, the graphical integration will provide a very
simple to use, push-button approach for modelers to modularly and efficiently
derive precise run-time monitors for business processes that can be later securely
deployed.
5 Discussion
We have described and formalized a modular approach for the synthesis of
run-time monitors for reusable security-sensitive workflows. We have shown the
scalability of modular monitor synthesis by means of experiments. We have
also discussed the initial implementation of a tool integrating an editor with a
repository of business processes extended with the capability of storing associated
run-time monitors so that the modular synthesis of monitors can be exploited in
business re-use.
Reuse in Business Process Management has been an intense topic of research
and industrial application; see, e.g., [8,6]. Several works in the field of Petri net
have investigated modularity; see, e.g., [12]. To the best of our knowledge, none
of the works in these contexts addresses security issues as we do here. The most
closely related work is [3], which is extended here with the notion of modularity.
As future work, we intend to fully implement the architecture in Figure 4 by
using available repositories, such as Apromore [15]. We also plan to perform ex-
tensive experiements concerning process reuse on the business processes available
in the repositories.
6 https://code.google.com/p/signavio-core-components/
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Fig. 5. Sequential (left), simultaneous (center) and alternative (left) composition
A Composition patterns
We show how the basic control patterns in workflow management (see, e.g., [17,9])
can be expressed by the gluing operator ⊕ introduced above. We consider
sequential (when n processes are executed one after the other), parallel (when n
processes are executed in parallel), and alternative composition (when only one out
of n processes is executed). For lack of space, we do not consider other composition
patterns (such as the hierarchical one, when a task is refined to a complex process)
which can also be expressed in our approach by using a bit of ingenuity. To simplify
the technical development below, we describe each composition pattern using
two components (S1, Int1) and (S2, Int2); the generalization to n components
is straightforward. Additionally, again for the sake of simplicity, assume that
P ij = {pij} and P oj = {poj} in Intj = (Aj , P ij , P oj , Hoj , Cij) for j = 1, 2, i.e. there is
just one input and just one output place in both components. (Notice that this
assumption is satisfied when considering workflow nets—see, e.g., [18]—which
are a particular class of Petri nets frequently used for modeling workflows.)
Sequential composition. Let us consider the situation in which the process specified
by component S1 must be executed before the process executed by component
S2. To model this with the gluing operator, it is sufficient to consider a set G =
GEC ∪GAuth of gluing assertions over Int1 and Int2 such that GEC = {pi2 ⇔ po1}.
Notice that (S1, Int1)⊕G (S2, Int2) = (S2, Int2)⊕G (S1, Int1) by Theorem 1 but
because the gluing assertion in GEC is p
i
2 ⇔ po1, and not po2 ⇔ pi1, the process
specified by component (S1, Int1) will always be executed before that specified
by (S2, Int2) when considering their composition.
Parallel composition. Let us consider the situation in which the processes specified
by components S1 and S2 must be executed in parallel. To model this with the
gluing operator, we need to preliminarily introduce two other components, each
containing a single transition, one for splitting and one for joining the execution
flow. Formally, we define C∗ = ((((P∗, D∗, ∅, ∅, ∅),Tr∗, ∅), (∅, P i∗, P o∗ , ∅, ∅)), Int∗) ,
Pas = {p0as, p1as, p2as}, Das = {das}, Paj = {q0aj , q1aj , q2aj}, Daj = {daj},
Tras := {p0as ∧ ¬das → p0as, p1as, p2s, das := F, T, T, T}
Traj := {q0aj ∧ q1aj ∧ ¬daj → q0aj , q1aj , q2aj , daj := F, F, T, T} ,
and Int∗ = (∅, P i∗, P o∗ , ∅, ∅) with P ias = {p0as}, P oas = {p1as, p2as}, and P iaj =
{q0aj , q1aj}, P oaj = {q2aj}, where ∗ stands for a(nd) s(plit) or a(nd) j(oin). At this
point, it is sufficient to consider a set G = GEC ∪GAuth of gluing assertions over
Int1, Int2, Intas, and Intaj (recall the associativity of the gluing operator stated
in Theorem 1) such that GEC = {p1as ⇔ pi1, p2as ⇔ pi2, po1 ⇔ q0aj , po2 ⇔ q1aj}.
Alternative composition. Similarly to parallel composition, we need to intro-
duce also for this pattern two other components, each containing two non-
deterministic transitions to route the execution flow in one of the two com-
ponents (S1, Int1) or (S2, Int2) instead of both as above. Formally, we define
C∗ = ((((P∗, D∗, ∅, ∅, ∅),Tr∗, ∅), (∅, P i∗, P o∗ , ∅, ∅)), Int∗) , Pos = {p0os, p1os, p2os},
Dos = {dos}, Poj = {q0oj , q1oj , q2oj}, Doj = {doj},
Tros :=
{
p0os ∧ ¬dos → p0os, p1os, p2s, dos := F, T, F, T,
p0os ∧ ¬dos → p0os, p1os, p2s, dos := F, F, T, T
}
Troj :=
{
q0oj ∧ ¬doj → q0oj , q2oj , doj := F, T, T,
q1oj ∧ ¬doj → q1oj , q2oj , doj := F, T, T
}
,
and Int∗ = (∅, P i∗, P o∗ , ∅, ∅) with P ios = {p0os}, P oos = {p1os, p2os}, and P ioj =
{q0oj , q1oj}, P ooj = {q2oj}, where ∗ stands for o(r) s(plit) or o(r) j(oin). At this
point, it is sufficient to consider a set G = GEC ∪GAuth of gluing assertions over
Int1, Int2, Intos, and Intoj (recall the associativity of the gluing operator stated
in Theorem 1) such that GEC = {p1os ⇔ pi1, p2os ⇔ pi2, po1 ⇔ q0oj , po2 ⇔ q1oj}.
